April 2004 was the toughest month in the U.S.-led occupation of Iraq. Current figures show 153 soldiers died and more than 800 were injured.

The Abu Ghraib Prison scandal, the beheading of Nick Berg, and the assassination of the Iraqi Governing Council president have shaken U.S. confidence in the postwar effort. Even though Sunni and Shiite insurgencies seem to be under control, many experts feel these groups will challenge U.S. troops and threaten the success of the power transfer to Iraq June 30.

With growing Republican criticism of the current Iraq strategy and falling approval numbers, President Bush's recent speech at the Army War College was an attempt to restore confidence in his administration. Lacking detail, his speech fell short in explaining much of what needs to be addressed.

The administration has only two real options: either internationalize postwar efforts by placing the mission under U.N. control, or rely on Iraqis to assume responsibility.

While the Bush administration clearly wants the U.N. backing, it wants Iraqis to have complete control over the process. According to the president, U.S. troops would assist Iraqi security forces, but responsibility for the country's security would be in Iraqi hands.

Yet these are the same forces that refused to fight alongside coalition forces in Fallujah and in several southern Iraqi towns. Few experts believe Iraqis will be ready to assume these responsibilities.

Alternatively, ample evidence exists to support an international police presence to maintain civil order. This would allow U.S. military personnel to focus on long-term training of Iraqi security personnel.

It is in the administration's best interests to reconsider this approach. A U.N. mission with the direct support of the U.S. and the U.K. should be responsible for civilian policing and security until Iraqi security forces are ready to patrol the street. The United States must continue its military role in the interim and be ready to fund international police to enforce the law alongside an existing Iraqi police structure.

The Bush administration must also reconsider transferring power to Iraqis on June 30. More time is needed to bolster Iraqi institutions and to ensure that leaders from the three major factions cooperate and compromise in building a united state.

Yes, there is danger that postponing transfer of sovereignty will incite a new round of insurgencies. But greater unrest awaits if power is relinquished completely on June 30.

Bush's best strategy would be to allow the U.N. and Lakhdar Brahimi the flexibility to negotiate a timetable that would permit the creation of a firm democratic foundation for a stable country. Giving Iraqis more power now will not guarantee Iraq's transformation. Competition among political factions could move the country closer to civil war.

The administration trusts that Iraqi leaders will act according to the common good, but in a country that is deeply divided along sectarian lines, perspectives on the common good are extremely divergent.

The administration's steadfast belief in "Iraqification" rather than internationalization is faulty. A new strategy is critical to ensure success and should include the following elements:

Increase the number of coalition troops to end insurgencies.

A U.N. police presence should be deployed alongside the Iraqi police to allow coalition troops to fulfill more immediate military objectives.

A new mission should be established, directed by a person with broad international backing and U.N. Security Council approval, to assist the interim government by ensuring democratization; mediate conflicts between Iraq's ethno-religious groups; organize elections; and help Iraqi leaders write a new constitution. This mission would not control military efforts.

The June 30 deadline should be respected, but with the understanding that the Iraqi interim government would not hold full sovereignty.

Full sovereignty would be transferred once Iraqis have elected a transitional government, slated to take place in January 2005. To prevent a coup d'etat, the Iraqi military would be under U.S. command until a permanent government is established.

With U.S. elections looming, Bush may be tempted to dismiss a call for a new strategy. He must put Iraqi and American interests first. Iraq must become a successful democracy as a role model for the rest of the Arab world.

Bush's democratic goals for the Middle East have great validity. It is his means in achieving them that are suspect.

Hamilton College government professor Carlos Yordan's research and published materials have focused on reconstruction issues related to Iraq and the former Yugoslavia.